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In recent years we have seen the rise of a bold and fruitful approach
which attempts to explain the development of individual earnings as if they
result from a continuous choice process. A basic part of this approach of
the on—the—job training hypothesis (See Becker [1964], Mincer [1962, 1974],
Ben Porath [1967], Rosen [1972, 1973]) whereby individuals are facing, at each
point in their life, a set of options which involves the trading of current
earnings in exchange for higher future earning capacity. Given these options
the individual chooses an optimal strategy which is then reflected in his
observed earning profile.
An often noted obstacle to the empirical implementation of this idea
is the lack of data on individual profiles. The empirical analysis was mostly
confined to a single cross section, and the implicit assumption was that there
are no systematic differences among individuals who entered the labor force
at different points of time. Studies which dutifully lamented this situation, did
not provide much lead into what could be the expected differences in alternative
types of data. To spell out such differenc clearly seemed premature in light
of the absence of any such alternatives. However, with the growing avail-
ability of successive cross sections as well as individual follow—up data
it is no longer possible to escape the issue. An importantpotentialsource of
a systematic relation between single cross section, successive cross section,
andlongitudinaldata is provided by vintage effects (See Welch [1973]). The
purpose of this study is to present a simple but explicit model of on—the—job
training which mayenableus to separate and identify various types of vintage
effects. An attempt is made to apply the model to the data on the earnings
of American scientists in the period 1960—1970.2
I. The Model
We shall present in this section a simple model of investment in human
capital which can be solved analytically. The purpose is to obtain a form-
ulation which is amenable to estimation and to comparative statics analysis.
Suppose that observed earnings are governed by the following equation
(1) Y =KG(K)
K
where K is human capital *L is its rate of change. The rate of change kis
K K
bounded between the maximal potential rate denoted by a —6and a lower rate
—6which is the depreciation rate. (We do not allow negative gross investment.)
Jobs are assumed to offer different "growth. options" and l_G(1) measures the
portionof earning capacity which the individual has to give up in order to
purchase a specified growth rate. It seems natural to assume G(a —6)=0and
G(— 6) —1,that is, all earning capacity is sacrificed for the best growth prospect,
and if nothing is sacrificed then human capital will deteriorate at the rate 6.
It is clear that G' () shouldbe negative in an equilibrium wage structure.
We ignore here the issue of leisure choice and assume that the objective of
each individual is the maximization of the present value of lifetime earnings.








The auxiliary variable x can be interpreted as an index of the training content of3
the various job opportunities. The length of life is denoted by T, and r is the
exogenoualy given rate of interest.Using the Hamiltonian function the above
maximization canbetransformed into the following maximization problem:
(3) Max eT K[g(x) + I,(ax—6)]
cx.l
with 3'— r—g(x)—*(ax—8) ,$(T) —0
This maximization problem is easy to Interpret. The returns from
human capital, (in the form of "full" wages per unit of capital) depend on the amount
of investment. The "full" wage consists of the observed current wages Kg(x)
and of the returns for investment Ki (ax —6).Were
(4) (T) =I e
-
[g(x)+(ax-6)]d
denotes the average (and marginal)benefitsof the investment activity. Note that
at each point of time these benefits are equal to the present value of future optimal
of returns. The optimal path is such for any given shadow price, ,
theindividual chooses the level of investment which maximizes the full wage.
The optimal path of investment can be presented graphically as a movement
along the investment frontier g(x), which is associated with the changing shadow
price for investment. We propose the following specification for the Investment





Thebroken line ab describes the allocutions which the individual can achieve by
dividing his time between "school" and work at the activity which maximizes
current earnings. The line ab' describes the training options offered by the job
market. Our basic assumption is that there is a range in which higher efficiency
is achieved by pure on—the—job training than by combination of schooling and
work. This is reflected by the line ab' being above ab for some x.It is also
reasonable to assume that high levels of training are more efficiently obtained
at school so that ab is ab' for some x. The actual frontier is then given by







As long as a* >—g'(x0)the individual will specialize In schooling (x =1).If
—g'(x0) the individual will be indiffeent among the various allocations of
time between school andworkat the job x0. For —g' (0) <a<-g'(x0) the
individual will choose a tangency point in which a*—g'(x). Finally if
—g'(0) there will be noinvestment and the job with maximal current earning
willbe chosen.
The above specification of theinvestmentfrontier is designedto capture,
among other things, the discontinuity In the investment in human capital which
seemsto occur upon leaving school.
Since we areinterested, inthis paper, in a modelwhich Is solvable in a closed
form we proceed by specifying a functional form for the investment frontier.
Suppose that the opportunity set for pure on—the—job training is given by:
(6) f= [1.—- ( + a > > 0 0<ci<1
ci<
Theparameter can be interpreted as the efficiency of producing human capital
on the job. Higher values of imply that for given growth rate a higher proportion
of earning capacity is retained. The assumption that <ameans that even if
all earning capacity is given up then the rate of growth which is attained by pure
on—the—job training will be less than that which can be achieved in school. In
the same vein 'a'can be interpreted as the efficiency of producing human capital
in school. Higher values of 'a' mean that upon giving up all earning capacity
and choosing the schooling activity higher growth is attained. Finally, a is a
parameter which governs the concavity of the opportunity set; we assume that 0 <ci<1
The condition a <B/aguarantees that for small levels of investment on—the—job
training is more efficient.6
Using the definition x = +5) we obtain the following specification
for g(x).
(7) g(x) =(1-x) for x
a a c—l
(1 —-- x0)_— (1—
x0)X for1x ￿
where =a
,a>and 0 l—c a
This particular form leads to an extremely simple optimal pattern for
the observed net earnings. The rate of growth of earnings is piece—wise con-






Productivelife is thus divided into three phases: a schooling phase in which no earnings
are observed, an investment period in which observed earnings are positive and grow at a
constant rate, and a non—investment period In which earnings decline at a constant rate.
The length of each phase, as well as the slope of the earnings a*d investment profiles
in each phase can be related to the basic parameters which the individual faces.
.7




— 1—ai r(a—r—cS)(l—c&) 9 T0
—T1-
-r—6
(10) = —+ (—r—5) for T0T <
= forTi T
(11) =a + for T0 ￿ T <
=0 forT1T<T
where Y denotes observed earnings and y == g(x)is the proportion of
earnings capacity spent at the "production" of earnings and l—y is the
proportion invested. Even though these activities are performed jointly
on the job one may think of y as the "proportion of time" spent in pro-
ducing goods, and l—y as the proportion of time spent in producing new
knowledge. (see Mincer [1974, p. 19])
The boundary conditions for this system are:
(12) y(T) =1, y('r) =g(x
= — 1)]
(13) Y(t0) =KOe_T0y(TO)
where Y(T0) can be interpreted as observed starting salaries and K is
the exogenously given initial level of human capital.
As seen from the above set of equations there are some restrictions
on the parameters which are implicit in a life time earnings profile which
includes all three phase8. The basic condition is:
(:4) a > r+ô which implies 8>(r+)cz8
The two conditions in 14 are required if investment is ever to be prof it—
able. Specifically, if< (r-FcS)a then the zero investment period will
exhaust the whole working life. If a < r-b5 then a period of specialization
is not optimal. This can be verified by noting that in this caseevalu-
ated at T0 is negative and stays negative thereafter, so that y(r1) =1
cannot be satisfied. The interpretation of these two conditions is quite
transparent for positive investment to exist, it is necessary that the
returns from investment exceed the costs associated with the postponement
of earnings.
As suggested by Becker [1964, pp. 14—15] and Ben—Porath [1967], one
may explain the general shape of the earning profile as if it reflects
investment decisions. In particular the positive slope during the on the
job investment period reflects positive and decreasing investment on the job)"
The concavity of the log earnings profile depends, however, on the specific
trade—off function g(x). The specific form (7) which we adopted has the
property thatincreases with age as y increases. The degree of convexity
in y (concavity in investment time) is just sufficient to offset the reduc-
tion inas investment decreases.
The comparative statics of the model are also extremely simple. Consider
first a change in the interest rate. One of the specific aspects of the theory
of investment in human capital as applied to the development of earnings is
that an increase in the interest rate will tend to reduce the slope of the log
earnings profile. This is directly evident from equation (1O. It can be
seen from equation (8) that the length of the no investment period, T —
willincrease; that is, the peak in earnings will be attained at an earlier
age. Since y(To) and y(r) are both independent of r and since T is decreas-
ing with r for every y, the individual will stay a longer period in the region
of on—the—job investment. It follows that To must decrease, i.e., the mdi—
vidual will invest less in schooling. These changes are summarized in fig. 3.Consider, next, the issue of differences in ability. Differences In the initial
stock of human capital K0 will induce parallel shifts in logarithmic earnings
function without any further effect on the length of the various investment period.
•
An alternative specification is to associate increase in ability with an increase
in the efficiency of "producing" human capital as represented by the parameters
aand .Ifa person is a better student at school (higher a )the
effect will be higher y0 while and remain the same. It is easy to
show that must go up.— In other words, there will be a longer period in school
with a lower investment on the job once out of school. The log earnings profile











FIgure 4a. Figure 4b.10
If a person is a better on—the—job student (higher )willincrease
3/
while Yo will decrease. The effect on T1Ispositive and on T0negative
In other words this individual will invest less in schooling and more in
on the job training. The log earnings profile will have a higher slope,
and will peak at a later age. (See figure 4b.)
The most realistic case seems to be that in which both a and in-
crease. As seen, the effect on the length of the schooling period is in
this case ambiguous. An interesting special case is that in which the
optimal level of schooling, Toremainsthe same. The implication of higher
ability will be a higher log earnings profile with a higher slope and a
later peak. Another special case is that in which a and 8 grow at the
same rate so that y, the initial investment in on the job training, remains
the same. In this case higher ability will lead to more schooling, and the
log earnings profile will have a higher slope and a later peak.
An Important empirical phenomenon Is the existence of considerable
variation in the in which a given level of schooling is obtained. Pos-
sible reasons for a postponement in the completion of schooling are:
1. Imperfection of the capital market.
2. Exogenous events such as military service.
3. Differences in preferences towards leisure.
4. Uncertainty with respect to one's ownabilitiesand preferences.
.11
Each of these causes for delay may have different implications for the shape
of the log earnings profile after the completion of school.
Individuals with limited access to the capital market may take longer to
obtain a given level of schooling. If they continue to face a higher rate of
interest after completing school their log earnings profile will be flatter with
an earlier peak. The question rises, however, why would individualswho face
different rates of interest choose the same level of schooling. One possible
reason is that schooling is only partially divisible. So that a wholedistribu-
tion of desired optimal levels of schooling collapses into three single levels, i.e.,
B.A., M.A., and Ph.D.
If differences in the access to the capital market is the prime cause for the
variation in the age at which degree is obtained, we are likely to find a negative
interaction between the duration of the postponement and the slope of the log
earnings function during the post school period.
The effect of an exogenous time "tax" such as military service is to shorten
the horizon. If an individual who has performed military service, whom we may call
a late starter (see Johnson and Stafford [1974]), is restricted to leave thelabor
force at the same age as the "early" starter he will simply reduce his period of
specialization. His log earnings profile will be lower with the of peak and
entry remaining the same. This, of course, is a quite unrealistic resultwhich
follows from the assumption that the age of retirement Is exogenous. A perhaps
more realistic assumption is that for brief postponements the length of thework—
period is constant (See Mincer [1974, p.lO—il]).
The effect of leisure preferences is more complex and was discussed elsewhere.
(See Blinder and Weiss [19751). Suffice it to say that individuals with a high rate
of time preference may decide to choose an increasing profile of hours of work with
a possible "retirement" period before school. Such individuals will later show a12
relatively steep earnings function. The result is a possible positive
interaction between the slope of the earnings profile and the age of entry into
the labor force.
The role of schools in providing information to the individual and to the
market (via certification) is well known. Depending upon their specific charac-
teristics and their tastes towards risk, individuals with a given amount of formal
schooling may have different investments in search. At the present level of analysis
the expected effects on the slope of the earning profile can only be incorporated
within the residual as part of our Ignorance.
Effects
As we have seen a basic property of the simple model is that the
change in log earning is constant during the investment period. For the
purpose of empirical estimation one would prefer a formulation in which
the concavity of the log earning function would be determined by, rather than
imposed on, the data. Non-linearjties can be introduced in many ways with
varying degrees of complexity. We will suggest some possibilities and then
choose the one which turns out -to -be mathematically the simplest.
Our special form for g(x) has the property that the growth of log earnings
is independent of x. It is easy to choose any number of alternative specifications
for g(x) which would lead to a smoothly concave log earnings profile.-' Since on
purely economic considerations there seems to be no justification to prefer one
or the other, and since the specification which we have chosen is clearly of the
simplest possible form we would give it up only as a last resort.
An implicit simplifying assumption which we used in the construction of
the simple model is that the rate of transformation betweenanddepends13
only on the choice of occupation, and is independent of K. This neutrality
assumption means that the "productivity" of the individual in "producing" rates
of growth depends only on the proportion of his current earnings which he is
willing to give up. An obvious generalization therefore is to allow the amount
of accumulated human capital to affect this trade—off. Again it is easy to
produce such generalizations which would lead to a smoothly concave log earnings
function. Clearly, the necessary assumption is that past accumulation reduces
the capacity for further growth. Without the explicit introduction of job specific
components of human capital it is not clear whether such an assumption is
in fact plausible, and again it can be incorporated only at the price of a
considerable increase in complexity.
A perhaps more plausible extension is to introduce explicit
effects. We have already included in the model depreciation as a function
of past accumulation of human capital. We shall assume that the capacity to
produce new human capital via learning in school or on—the-job training is
decreases with age.Consider a model in which a(T) =a01T
and
(T) = .Thatis, the ability to learn in school and on the job
depreciates with age, T ,atthe same constant rate, y. In this case





1—a+ -i--—(r+ iS —y)—6 for > T >,
and
(16) lnY(t0) =lnK5+f(a(t)-6)dt+ in - 1)114
where tis the age at which the schooling period begins.
(We are now allowing for individual differences in -r; previously it was
assumed zero for all individuals.)
Using our assumptions on a(t) and (-r) we can solve for Y(-r)
This results in the non—linear nquation:
(17) inY(t) =inK5
+ (a0e_YT —6)d-r + ctln [f—(- — 1)]
+[P—
—j—
(r-4 —y)]d-r for -r
Ti
To facilitate the estimation we can use a second degree Taylor approximation
around y =0,to obtain:
(17')lnY(T) c + c1 (To —T)+ C2 (T02 —T2)+ C3 (-r— TO)
+ c4 (T2 —T02)+ c5 T for .TTi










An important implication of the assumed age dependence is that "late starters"
will tend to have a flatter experience—log earning profile during their post
school years. The 1ope of their age—log earning profile is the same as that
of early starters but its level is lower.
Vintage and Time Effects
So far we assumed a perfectly static economy. Time as such did not
appear in the analysis. There are, however, changes in supply and demand,
and changes in technology which affect the wage level and its structure by
age (or experience). We now turn to examine these effects.
In the analysis of a static economy we could define human capital, with-
out ambiguity in terms of potential earnings. If, however, prices and technology
change, the same amount of knowledge will "buy" different amounts of goods
depending upon the date of its application. Let us therefore define K(t,t)
as the maximum amount of earnings that an individual who is of age t,attime t,
could obtain at some fixed prespecif led date. Let R(t) be the rental rate
of human capital at time t. We can then write the individual's earning
capacity at time t as R(t)K(T,t) while K(T, t) is controlled by the
individual via his investment policy, R(t) is exogenous to him and is
determined by the conditions of supply and demand.1
It may be useful to sketch briefly the determination of the rental rate
of human capital in the context of a simple aggregate general equilibrium
model. Consider an economy with a fixed population and a uniform age distribution.16
.
Ateach point of time the amount of "working human capital" in the economy
— T
is given by K(t) =fy(T,t)K(T,t)dTwhere y(T,t) is the proportion of
0
"time" which individual of age T spends in the production of goods at time t
Each individual also produces his own new human capital according to the
production function y(r,t) =G[] .Thisinvestment process can be
carried out either at work or at school in which case y(T,t) =0.Let
there be a single composite good z which can be accumulat.4.or consumed. The
production function of z is Z(P,K) where P is the amount of accumulated
physical capital.
A potential source of growth in this model with fixed population is the
improvement in the labor force through learning by doing. In the simplest case,
each generation can be viewed as starting with a higher initial level of human
capital, thus embodying the knowledge accumulated by past generations.-' Let
p =t—Tbe the individual's vintage, we may write K(T,t) =K(p,'r)and assume
that K(p,O) is an increasing function of .i. We have seen that for given interest
and rental rates an increase in the initial level of human capital will not change
the investment pattern of the individual. Later vintages will have uniformly
higher levels of human capital throughout their life. If K(p,O) grows at a
constant rate, so will the aggregate of all age groups. The model then becomes
identical to one in which population grows at a constant exogenous rate. If the
production function is homogenous of degree 1 and iF savings are, say, a constant
proportion of output then the economy will have the usual steady state properties;
the interest rate and the rental rate will in fact remain constant, so that ex-
pectations are fully realized.
S17
It is clear that past knowledge is not transmitted in such a costless one
shot fashion. In fact, schools and firms serve as a vehicle for the inter-
generational transfer of knowledge. The embodiment of past knowledge requires
the investment of time on the part of the individual and is therefore spread
over a considerable part of his life. As the general knowledge accumulates,
recent vintages benefit more from the investment of their time in school. It
seems plausible that they also become more "efficient" in terms of their learning
on the job.
Put differently, the rate of transmission depends jointly on the stock of
existing knowledge as well as the amount of time (and other resources) that each
individual spends learning, and on the amount of resources which are spent
teaching him.
It is obvious that such a trend of increasing learning efficiency is not
neutral with respect to its effect on the shape of the investment plan. Other
things being equal, new vintages will tend to invest more in human capital. They
will spend more time in school and their earning profiles will be steeper. It
is, however, not clear whether other things can in fact remain constant. For
instance, if a larger initial segment of life is spent investing in human
capital the demand for borrowing by the young vintages will increase, old vintages
will be induced to provide the necessary transfer only at increasingly higher
interest rates. The increase in the interest rate will, of course, provide a
check to the tendency for Increased investment. Also the proportion of physical
capital and human capital used inproductionwilidecrease and the rental forhuman
capital will thus decline.7I' Since there is a limit to the amount of productive
capacity which can be transmitted in a given period of time, and also to the
amount which can be stored in a given individual, the process which we described
is likely to stop at some stationary state.18
For the purpose of empirical implementation it is important to distinguish
between two alternative specifications of the increase in individual learning
efficiency. We may assume that the parameters a anddepend simply on the
chronological time of investment. Thus, independently of the date of entry into
the labor force all investors at t have equal learning efficiency. Under such
circumstances there will be a motivation to postpone the investment in human
capital. It is possible, for instance, that individuals will decide to enter or
re—enter school at later stages of their life. An alternative view which is
perhaps more plausible is that at each point of time the general advance in
knowledge affects individuals differentially depending upon how recently their
human capital was acquired. The reason is that new knowledge is often different
from past knowledge, that is, a different technique, a different theory, and
occasionally a different language is used to present it. Therefore, recent
vintages will find the general advance of knowledge to be more complementay
to their human capital, and will be relatively more efficiency in producing new
human capital than older vintages at any given point in time. An extreme version
of this view, one that allows us to retain the simple structure of the individual
maximization problem, is that each successive vintage is endowed with a superior
production function (i.e. higher a andas well as higher K0) for new knowledge
which remains fixed throughout its life.
In a changing economy, expectations play a crucial role. Rather than
assuming perfect foresight we may assume that the individual can correctly
predict trends, so that his expectations are realized only in some average sense
over his lifetime. The development of earning over the life cycle will thus
contain a systematic part which is determined by the initial expectations and
a transitory part which depends on current realizations.
The maximization problem facing an individual of vintage p can be
described as follows. The individual is endowed with an initial stock K and19
learning parameters a and .Heforms expectations on the time path forthe
interest rate r + T and for the rental rateon human capital R(+T). The
solution of this maximization problem isalmost identical to the one given by
equations (7) and (10) (see Appendix)and the development of the systematic part





where is the expected rate of change in R at time ii+t.The initial value
of earning is given by:
(19) ln Y(T0) =inK+aT + 1n[ (—1)]+ in R(+T).
If g and r are expected to remain constant
then each vintage will have a lifetime
profile for log earnings which is piecewiselinear. However, different vintages
will have different profiles. In Figure 5 wedraw the profiles of two indivi-
duals of successive vintages but with the samelevel of schooling.
It is seen that under our assumptionslater vintages show a higher slopeof the
•
log earnings profile. This is areflection of the vintage effect onthe
productivity of learning on the job.The difference in the level ofthe two
profiles reflects the increase inthe productivity of learning inschool (and
6f,j
Figure 520
possibly the increase in K). The observed difference in levelprobably under-
estimates these effects since the newer generation islikely to choose a higher
level of initial investment on the job.
It should be pointed out that vintage or cohort effectsmay arise in a
number of additional ways. Some are specificexogenous factors such as a war,
for instance; others may reflect trends other than thegeneral advance in know-
ledge. Specifically, we would expect the average ability (or productivity) of
scientists who obtained their degrees during World War II to be lower than that
of vintages of more normal times. More to the point, if there is in facta
trend of decreasing school admission standards, and if there is a high correla-
tion in the population between the two types of learning abilitiesa and ,
thensuch a trend would mitigate (or possibly offset) the effects of the advance





Having described the simple model of on—the—job training in some detail
we are now ready to present some testable implications and to suggest the
methods by which they can be tested.
There are two broad types of implications which follow from the model.
One relates to individual earnings profiles. The other relates to the earnings
profiles of a group of individuals who differ in some systematic fashion.
Consider first individual profiles. Our basic interest here is in the
relationships between the exogenous parameters which the individual faces and
his various schooling and training decisions. An inherent difficulty, however,
is that most of the exogenous variables are either in principle or in practice
unobservable. We are thus reduced to testing hypotheses on the relationships
between various observed aspects of individual behavior. Within our simple model
these hypotheses assume the form of predicted relations between the level of
degree, the quality of schooling, the age at which the highest degree was
obtained, its vintage, and the slope of the log earning profile during the
on—the—job investment period. Similarly we may examine the effects of sex and
type of employer on the slope of the log earning profiles. Finally we may
analyze the effect of some current rather than initial conditions on the slope.
Thus one may consider the effect of age or experience on the slope of the log
earning profile.(This amounts to specifying the appropriate non—linear log
earning profile.)
Most frequently obtainable are data on the earnings of a set of individuals
at a single point in time. We may fit an earnings function to such cross
sectional data, but since individuals of different experience in this kind of
sample must come from different vintages, the resulting function will not be22
the earnings function of some representative individual.However, given some
specific assumptions on the individual profiles and on the manner in which
vintages differ, we can predict the form of the cross section relation.
Furthermore, we can predict the relationship between the slopes of the earnings
profiles in successive cross sections. More generally, the existence of vintage
effects introduces systematic interrelationships between observed cohort and
cross section data. Given an appropriate specification they can be identified
from poled cross section time series data.
2. Definition of Variables and Functional Forms
The purpose of this section is to describe a specification of individual
earnings profiles and vintage effects which can be used to extract information
on the slope of individual earnings rofiies and cross section profiles from
pooled cross section data. For the purpose of exposition I shall discuss
first the case of linear individual log earnings profiles and introduce non-
linear age effects at a later stage.
Let us assume that the individual expects the interest rate and the rate
of change in the rental on human capital to remain fixed. The systematicpart
of the earnings profile is then obtained by integrating equation (18). The
observed earnings of. a particular individual are:




+ 6) (T —T0)+d .For T
T1
where d denotes a cyclical unexpected deviation from trend.
For the purpose of empirical application the simples possible assumption






We shall identify as the year at which the individual obtained his highest
degree. Thus the following identity holds for every individual.
(22) 1i =
t—[(T—T0)+ cJ
wheret is the timeatwhich income is observed, 'r —ispost school
experience, and c is a possible "break" in the accumulation of human capital.
Let us also denote s =
T0—Tas the schooling period, then equation (20)
can be rewritten as
(23) lnY(t, T —'re,s)=
k0+ 1ny + (a0 + a1t —cS)s+ (+k1)t +
1 +




If all individuals are observed at the same point of time, if the unobserved
initial investment y is ignored, and if we furtherassume uninterrupted
accumulation of experienc€ (c =0)
then equation (23) is identical in formwiththat which was used extensively
by Mincer [1974] and his students. Notice, however, that within our simple
framework it is purely a cross section phenomenon and a different form, possibly
linear in the logs should be fitted to longitudinal data. Notice the special
forminwhich the cross section function depends upon time. Under the vintage24
hypothesis both the constant and the coefficient of experience should be higher
in a later cross section. Note also that the coefficient of the linear term
is an underestimate of the experience effect (of the latest vintage in the
cross section under study), since it captures, in part, the vintage effects on
schooling and on initial level of human capital.
In fields with fast rates of advance (i.e., higha1 and l where
vintage effects are relatively important, the constant and the coefficient of
experience2 will be relatively high (in absolute value). The effecton the
coefficient of experience is ambiguous and may be different depending upon which
cross section we consider. If vintage effects operate only at the school level,
and are relatively weak in their effect on the efficiency of learning on the
job then the coefficient of experience will tend to be smaller in fields with
fast advance, while the coefficient of exp2 will be unaffected.
For the purpose of empirical estimation from pooled cross sections for a
group with fixed level of schooling it will be convenient to rewrite equation (20)
in the following form:
(24)1nYc+(a0—5)s+(+k1+a1s)t+d+ l[o—a(r—)—5—(1—a)(k1+as)](T—T)
1—a
+ 1 (r—r0)p — c(k1+a1s)
1—a
The slope of the longitudinal (cohort) profile for the reference vintage
(i.e. with i=0)is obtained by adding the coefficient of time
(eliminating dt through averaging) to the coefficient of experience in
equation (24). The slope of the cross sections profile is obtained by
adding t times the coefficient of the interaction between year of highest
degree and experience to the coefficient of experience in equation (24).
It is obvious that the basic parameters of the model, that is
a0, a1, i3,, l' S, r,cannot be identified from equation (24). There is25
a hope of identification only if one incorporates simultaneously all the
aspects of the individual profile, including the age at which the profile
peak, the slope of the earning profile during the zero investment interval
and the length of the schooling period. Since we have information on
individuals only during 10 years of their life, and since our data on the
length of the schooling period is very limited (we only have the level of
degree) there is little hope in identifying the basic parameters from the
present data. It should be pointed out that even if all the Information on
individual profiles is available, there are still two parameters which must
be determined a—priori. The most natural candidates are perhaps the Interest rate
and the exogenous growth rate.From an estimation point of view, it seems most
convenient to predetermine ain which case the remaining parameters are
linear functions of the regression coefficients so that one can derive
unbiased (but not most efficient) estimates for them.
A basic difficulty towards which we shall now address ourselves is the
separation of vintage effects from non—linearities in individual profiles.
The approach taken by Mincer in the analysis of cross section data was to
assume that individuals of different vintages have the same profile and that
for each individual the log earning profile is quadratic in experience.
It is clear that neither of the:two alternative Interpretations can be
rejected on a basis of a single cross section. However, if one has data
on a sequence of cross sections over a sufficiently long period of time the
two effects may be sorted out separat1y. Unfortunately our data covers a
relatively short period of ten years so that the multicollinearity between
experience and year of highest degree is still considerable. We have therefore
chosen to represent the non—linearity of the profile by using age rather than
experienceas the factor which causes the reduction in slope of the earning26
profile. Due to the considerable variation in the age at which thehighest
degree was obtained, the multicollinearity of age and year of highest degree is
smaller, and one can better separate vintage effect from non—linearitfes in
individual profiles. Introducing age effects wemay rewrite equation (17') as
(25)mY =c+ gt + cs —cs2+ T0(c + cs) + c(t—T0)
+ c [2T (TTo)J(T_To)
Wheret is the year of observation, s is the length of schooling
period, T0ageat highest degree, is post degree experience, and r
is age. The coefficients c, c, are defined on page 14; the
superscript p indicates that they are linear functions of p (i.e. year
of highest degree).
If one assumes away vintage effects then the implied cross section
relation is again very close to the form which was adopted by Mincer. It
can be rewritten in an unrestricted form using theidentity:
(26) (2T—(T—-r0))(T—t0) =2T(T—T0)+
(T—T0)2+ e(T—T0)
and allowing the coefficients for the three terms on the L.H.S. of (26) to
differ. In this generalization age at highest degree, breaks in experience,
and their interactions with experience appear as explanatory variables, in
addition to standard experience and experience2 terms. However, if one admits
vintage effects as well as non—linear individual profiles the cross section
relation becomes more complicated and is essentially of a cubic rather than
quadratic form in experience.
In trying to isolate the effects of age, experience, and vintage we shall
attempt to control for other factors which may affect the slope or the level of
the log earning function. We shall now briefly describe these variables.27
Predegree experience. Many individuals have some professional work
experience prior to obtaining their degrees. It is reasonable to assume that
given their postdegree experience the accumulation of predegree experience will
increase their earnings. Furthermore we may assume that those who worked a
longer period before obtaining a given degree had less access to the capital
market and faced a higher rate of interest. It is therefore expected that the
interaction between predegree experience and postdegree experience will be
negative.
Quality of school and level of degree. We obtained data on the ranking
of the schools which the various scientists attended. One may expect those who
attended schools which are ranked in the top ten to possess a higher learning—
on—the—job coefficient. This is possibly true for two reasons; the top ten
schools may select the students with a better native ability, and they also
provide more knowledge which can then be utilized in on—the—job training.
Furthermore, individuals who studied in the top ten, typically more expensive,
schools are likely to have better access to the capital market. We would there-
fore expect a higher slope for the earnings profiles of those who obtained their
degree from high quality schools. For very similar reasons we shall expect
positive interaction between the level of degree and the slope during the
investment period.
Sex. In a world in which human capital is at least partially specific,
women may be required to pay more in order to obtain general training. The
reason is that the expected duration of their employment within a given firm is
probably shorter. Depending upon the precise parameterization of this effect
it is possible (but not necessary) that as a result the female scientist will
have a lower slope of the earnings profile.
Type of employer. Observed earnings profiles as a function of experience
tend to differ both in slope and in level across type of employer (i.e. government,28
private industry, and educational
institutions). Most probably these differ-
ences are due to factors which oursimple model does not explicitlyaccount
for. Among them are differencesin the nature of thecontract, and thus the
sharing of risks, and differences innonmonetary returns. For these reasons
it seems desirable to control for the
type of employment. There is, however,
an opposing view, if there is considerablemobility across types of employment,
one may view it at least in part as amanifestation of the on—the—job training
process. In this case one would prefer not toadjust for the type of current
employer in analyzing the slope of theearnings profile.
I have estimated equation (25) with andwithout control for the type of
employer. The effect on the earnings profiles inmost fields is negligible.
It appears that despite the fairamount of mobility across types of employer
the correlation of type of employer andage (or experience) is small.!" To
avoid duplication we present resultsonly for the case with control for type
of employer.
Broken careers. Most Ph.D.s follow astraight career and their postschool
experience is therefore identical with the differencebetween their age and the
age at which they obtained their degrees. Occasionally therewill be a break;
a woman scientist may drop out for awhile,military service may intervene, etc.
Within our simplified framework these breaksare viewed as exogenous. Their
main effect is to increase thegap between age and experience and viitage and
experience. To partially control for the effects of suchinterruptions we add
the difference between years sincedegree and postdegree experience as an
explanatory variable.-1
In order to complete the specificationwe must consider the error terms
which one would add to equations (20),(24), and (25). We may distinguish
three different components of the errorterm: Pure chance elements which are
independent across observations, persistent unobserved leveleffects, and29
persistent unobserved slope effects. The persistent elements can be eliminated
to some extent if we have data on the same individuals over a period of time.
In the present study we use samples of different individuals at different
points of time and such control is impossible. Among the unobserved level
effects we have the initial level of human capital K0 and the initial investment
in on—the—job training y0. Under the present model K0 is unrelated to the
investment pattern of the individual and its omission causes no bias. On the
other hand, if we assume that more recent vintages start their working life
investing a larger proportion of their earnings capacity, the omission of y0
will cause an overestimate of the experience effect and an underestimate of the
growth effect. Among the unobserved slope effects are individual differences
in learning abilities and in access to the capital market. When uncontrolled,
these effects will cause heteroscedasticity in the errors and thus misspecif i—
cation of the variance of the estimated coefficients.30
LII. Estimation and Empirical Results
Our source of data is the National Register of TechnicalandScientific
Personnel. We produced three random samples of 10,000 scientists each from
the National Registers of 1960, 1966, and 1970. Theregression results which
we report below are estimated from the pool of these three samples.
Our working hypothesis is that vintage effects as well as other market
conditions are likely to be different in different scientific fields; we
therefore divided the sample into seven separate fields: Agriculture, Biology,
Chemistry, Earth Sciences, Mathematics, Physics, and Psychology. Since level
of schooling interacts with many of the explanatory variables it was considered
preferable to control for the level of degree by further subdividing each
sample into B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. holders. For the sake of brevity we report
on the effects of changes in the level of degree only for the aggregate of allS
fields. Results for the separate fields will be presented only for scientists
with a Ph.D. degree.
In each subsample we shall estimate equation (25) in two forms:
restricted and unrestricted.' The dependent variable is the log of basic
earnings. (Observations with zero basic earnings were eliminated.) Scientists
who were employed in academic institutions could report their annual basic
income on a 9 to 10, or an 11 to 12 month basis. We use a dummy variable to
distinguish these cases)1" The data also contained information on gross
earnings, which include consulting fees, honoraria, and the like. Though
conceptually superior, this measure of income was not used by most researchers
using the N.S.F. data. A probable reason is the problem of measurement errors
which may arise when the reporting scientist estimates his gross earnings. To31
allow comparability to other studies we present here earnings functions only
in terms of basic earnings.
When data on both experience (i.e. years of professional work experience)
and years since highest degree are available we break total experience into
predegree and postdegree experience along the lines suggested by Johnson and
Stafford [l974].?1 In the fairly large number of cases (up to 15 percent
in 1970) in which experience is not reported we set postdegree experience equal
to years since degree and preschool experience at the mean of the corresponding
group with complete information on both experience and years since degree.
Strictly speaking equation (25) is applicable only during the investment
on—the—job period. However, the length of the investment period is not observed.
On the arbitrary assumption that everyone below 50 is still investing, we may
truncate the sample at that age. However, by reducing the age (and experience)
range one loses considerable variation in the explanatory variablesand the
result is a reduction in the precision of the estimates. Due to the small sample
size in some of the separate fields we present the effects of the truncation
only for the aggregate of all scientists. In order to separate investment in
on—the—job training from investment in schooling we eliminated all students from
the sample; scientists who were not fully employed were also eliminated.
In Table 1 we present the mean and the standard deviations of the main
explanatory variables which are used in the regression analysis. There is a
surprising amount of variation in some of these means across fields. The
proportion employed by private industry varies from about 6 percent in agri-
culture to 50 percent in chemistry. The proportion of female scientists varies
from 2 percent in physics to 12 percent in psychology. The proportion of
scientists owning degrees from schools which are ranked in the top ten varies


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The variation in type of employer across levels of schooling is also
very large. Associated with increased schooling is a decrease in the proportion
of scientists who are employed in private industry and an increase in the pro-
portion employed in academicinstitutions)' There is also some reduction in
the proportion of female scientists. The amount of predegree experience tends
to increase with the level of schooling. It appears that a considerable portion
of the professional experience is accumulated through work during the schooling
period.
Breaking the sample by age appears to have little effect on the variables
which are not directly age related. In particular, the distribution by type
of employer is invariant. It is interesting to note, however, that the pro-
portion of female scientists in the over 50 group is somewhat higher, indicating
a late reentry of female scientists.
There is a considerable variation in the age at degree within field.
The standard deviation for age at Ph.D. is about five years, which is about
half the standard deviation in the chronological year at which the degree was
obtained. As one would perhaps expect, the variation in age of highest degree
tends to decrease with the level of schooling. There is also considerable
variation within fields (and across fields) in predegree experience and in the
difference between years since degree and postschool experience (i.e.
The estimates of the coefficients of equation (25) for the restricted
case are presented in Table 2. The method of estimation is ordinary least
squares. We intend to use the estimates from the pooled regressionin order
to answer two basic questions:
1. Which are the observed determinants of the starting salaries of
scientists?

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Oneofthe most important factors which determine the level of starting
salaries is the year at which the scientist entered into the labor force. The
coefficients of the sample years in Table 2 provide estimates of these effects.
As was previously explained, these coefficients reflect exogenous changes in
the rental price of human capital which are common to all scientists in the
sample as well as the specific gains due to increase in the efficiency of
learning in school. These last effects are mbodied differentially into
scientists of different vintages.
As seen, nominal starting salaries grew at an average rate of 5 percent
per year for scientists with Ph.D.s who are employed in academic institutions.
The increase in government is similar but in private industry it was only 4
percent. We thus note a narrowing of the wage differential between academic
institutions and private industry from about 40 percent in 1960 to about 30 per-
cent in 1970. The nominal rate of increase was fairly uniform over the period,
but due to the acceleration in the inflation rate (the consumer price index
increased by 1.53 percent per annum during 1960—1966, by 4.48 percent during
1966—1970, and by 2.71 percent during the period as a whole) there is a marked
reduction in real growth in the late sixties. The period is thus characterized
by changing demand and possibly supply conditions. The reduction in real
growth is most pronounced in physics where real starting salaries actually
declined during the period 1966—1970 (see Freeman (1975]. It is interesting
to note that in most fields the reduction is less pronounced in private industry.
Comparing across levels of schooling we note that scientists who are
employed in private industry enjoyed a similar rate of growth in starting
salaries (4 percent) whether they have a B.A. or a Ph.D. degree; scientists with
an M.A. degree fared a little better. Disaggregating by field we wereunable
to discern a consistent pattern of higher rate of increase in starting salaries
for higher levels of schooling as one would expect under the vintage hypothesis.38
On the other hand there is a distinct tendency for theyear of highest degree
experience interaction to increase with the level of degree. Itappears that
there is a "catching up" phenomenon whereby the increase in thevintage effect
by level of schooling is observed only after some years of experience.
Two other major sources of differences in starting salaries are associ-
ated with the choice of level of schooling and type of employer. As we have
already indicated, the effects of these factors tend to interact with the year
of entry into the labor force, either due to systematic vintage effects or as
a reflection of changing market conditions and imperfect substitution in the
short run among various types of human capital. Choosing 1970 as a reference
year, we see that a scientist with a Ph.D. can increase his starting salary
by 28 percent if he chooses to work in private industry. A scientist who plans
to work in private industry and who acquires a Ph.D. (at age 26) will have a
starting salary which is 42 percent higher than that of a B.A. (at age 22).
The corresponding difference for an M.A. degree (at 23 versus a B.A. at 22)
is 21 percent.
Differences in starting salaries across fields appear to be relatively
less important. Using again 1970 for comparison, we see that scientists with
Ph.D.s (age 26) who are employed in academic institutions could expect the
highest starting salary in psychology. The lowest starting salary would be in
chemistry, with a difference of 18 percent. The range of the differences
across field remained the same, but the structure varied during the period.
In 1960 psychology again had the highest starting salary, while biology had the
lowest. The difference in this case is about the same, 19 percent. As seen,
there is considerable variation in the growth of starting salaries during the
period. The lowest growth is observed in physics and agriculture, while in
mathematics and biology we note a relatively high rate of growth.39
We finally note the role of some other variables which affect starting
salaries. Both predegree experience and age at highest degree appear to have
a similar positive effect on starting salary. A one year postponement of
acquiring the Ph.D. degree will increase starting salary not only by the general
growth and vintage effect but also by an additional 1 percent. If the scientist
also accumulates some predegree work experience the additional effect will be
2 percent. These effects can be attributed to some positive accumulation of
knowledge while holding the level of degree constant, but they are considerably
smaller than the effects of learning from experience after the acquisition of a
degree. It is also seen that female M.A. and Ph.D. scientists can expect a
starting salary which is about 12 percent less than that ofmales.' Obtaining
a degree from a school which is ranked among the top ten does not have a signif i—
cant or systematic effect on the level of starting salaries.
Oneofthe main lessons which is to be learned from the human capital
approach to the analysis of earning is that the focusing on starting salaries
to the exclusion of later effects of individual choices may lead to highly
misleading conclusions. Generally we would expect some trade—off between
current and future earnings, and it is therefore important to examine also the
effects of the various explanatory variables on the slope of the earnings
profile after the entry into the labor force.
For the purpose of describing the various effects on the growth of earnings
we will choose as a reference group scientists with Ph.D.s in academic employ-
ment (all fields) who received their degrees in 1958. We will further restrict
ourselves to the case where no breaks in the accumulation of experience occur
so that the scientists' age and experience increase simultaneously with the
passage oftime)" Then,apart from specific (cyclical) year effects, the
expected growth in earnings of the reference group is governed by the equation:40
(27)
d =.023+ .0639 —.00146(Age—22).
The first constant on the R.H.S. of equation (27) is an estimate of the
17/ real growth in starting salaries.— It can be viewed as anupper bound on
the exogenous change in the rental price of human capital. Similarly the
second constant, which is the coefficient of postdegree experience in Table 2,
can be viewed as a lower bound for the initial effects of experience on the
growth of earnings (see equation 24). The sum of the two coefficients provide
an exact estimate of the combined effects of experience and growth.
As seen, the 1958 vintage enjoyed very substantial increases in real
earnings during the sixties. The predicted rate varied from 7.8 percent in
1960 (assuming that the Ph.D. degree was obtained at age 26) to 6.4 percent
in 1970. This reduction in the rate of increase in the rate of growth reflects
the effects of aging and the concavity of individual earnings profiles. The
actual reduction in the rate of growth was probably higher due to the changes
in demand during the decade.
The striking aspect of equation (27) is that even under the conservative
assumption that scientists will not enjoy any real increase in the rental
price of their human capital, we still would not predict a peaking of the
individual profile of the 1958 or later vintages during their working lifetimes.
These results are in contrast to the observed downturn in cross section pro-
files. In Figure 5 we draw some selected cross section profiles and individual
(cohort) profiles which are predicted by our pooled regression with various
assumptions on the real growth rate. Specifically, the solid vintage profiles
present the assumption that growth will follow the trend of the sixties. The
broken vintage profiles present the assumption that from 1970 onwards exogen-
ous growth will stop. Starting with 1970 and thereafter we thus put the growth






Figure 5.Pcc..t.cA E&rYth13. PhDs. A'\ f.ti4s.
3542
effect. As seen, the cross section profiles tendto peak after 26 or 27 years
of experience, and they are considerably flatter thanthe profiles of any given
vintage. The difference reflects vintage effects both in school andon the
job. The latter effect is captured by the positive interactionbetween year of
highest degree and postdegree experience (see Table 2). This interactionis
the cause of the two related tendencies of latervintages to have steeper pro-
files, and of later cross sections to be steeper and to peak later.
Some scientists in the sample report theiryears of professional
experience to be less than the number of years which passed sincethey obtained
their highest degree. We may interpret the differenceas a temporary break in
the accumulation of experience due to,say childbirth by a woman scientist.
Allowing the break to vary while holding age at highest degree andexperience
constant, we obtain:
(28)
d =.023+ .025 —.00146xpostdegreeexperience.
As seen, unless experience is quite high, a scientist who suffersa
break In the accumulation of experience will reenter the labor forceat a
higher wage. Of course, the gain in earning power is less than that ofan
otherwise identical scientist who did not drop from the labor force,-1but
the size of the gain which is at least 2.5percent per year still seems
surprisingly high. It seems likely that at least some of the scientists who
reported professional work experience to be less than theiryears since highest
degree did not withdraw completely from the labor force. Instead, theymay
have been in some other occupation and accumulatedexperience which though
not perfectly transferable is nevertheless useful in their main occupation.
Estimation of the age and experience effects from theyounger (less
than 50) group of scientists (see Table 2) retains the qualitativepattern of
the coefficients, but some of the age related effects are affected. In43
particular, the concavity of the age log earnings profile tends to increase.
It appears that there is considerable variation in the age at which invest-
ment in human capital stops. Such a variation leads to a flattening of the
observed average earnings profile at older ages. Alternatively, the differ-
ences may reflect some omitted variables which are age related, such as hours
of work, for instance.
In order to compare the slope of the earnings profile in the different
fields, we may evaluate equation (27) at some conon age level. The expected
rates of growth for scientists of the reference vintage (1958) at age 42 (which
is the mean age for the Ph.D.'s sample) are:
.0195 + .0266 in agriculture,
.0257 ÷.0388in biology,
.0207 +.0360in chemistry,
.0244 + .0367 in earth sciences,
.0273 + .0328 in mathematics,
.0178 + .0381 in physics,
.0226 + .0276 in psychology.
Again, the first number in each pair provides an estimate of the upper
bound for the growth in the rental price of human capital and the second as
an estimate of the lower bound of the effects of experience at that age. As
seen, the effects of experience tend to be large in biology, physics, and
chemistry and relatively low in agriculture and psychology. These last two
fields provide a sharp example for the trade—off between future and current
earnings in that high starting salaries are associated with low experience
effects. It appears that fields differ in the trade—off which they offer between
current and future earnings. In fields with considerable amounts of joint
research where highly experienced scientists and new entrants can combine their
research effort there is more opportunity for young scientists to invest in44
on—the—job training. This is reflected in relatively large numbers ofyoung
scientists who report research as their primary workactivity in fields like
chemistry, physics, and bio1ogy)J' Such fields are likely to havea larger
coefficient of experience.
Comparing across levels of schooling for scientists of the 1958 refer-
ence vintage who are employed in private industry, theexpected rates of growth
at age 42 are:
.0123 + .0287 for Ph.D.s,
.0189 + .0252 for M.A.s,
.0137 +.0207for B.A.s.
As seen, for a given age level there is a distincttendency for the slope
of the age earnings profile to decrease with the level ofschooling. Again,
these coefficients are underestimates of the effects of theaccumulation of
experience; taking into account the difference in the vintage effects by level
of schooling, the discrepancy in slope is in factlarger. These differences
are consistent with the view that scientists with a higher level of education
invest more in on—the—job training. Thismay be a result of either better
access to the capital market or higher learning ability.
As we have pointed out, there appears to exist a positive interaction
between year of highest degree and experience in their effecton earnings.
This tendency, however, is not uniform across fields or level ofschooling.
The interaction effects tend to be relativelystrong in physics and weak in
agriculture and psychology. They also tend to decrease with the level of that
schooling. The interaction is virtually absent among B.A.s. Itappears that
among scientists with B.A. degrees the advances in knowledge are spread rela-
tively uniformly across various levels of experience. The reason is probably
that their schooling and experience tend to be more general and less oriented
toward new techniques.45
In Figure 6 we plot the 1970 cross section profiles for scientists
with Ph.D. and B.A. degrees in private industry. We also draw the predicted
earnings of the 1970 vintages of Ph.D.s and B.A.'s, again under the two
alternative assumptions on real growth in earnings: (1) Real earnings will
continue to grow as during the sixties;(2) growth will stop. In the second
case the broken lines in the diagram describe the lower bound of growth in
earnings. As seen, due to the stronger vintage effects for Ph.D.s their cross
section profile tends to be somewhat flatter and to peak earlier. At the same
time the vintage profile of the Ph.D. scientist tends to be steeper. It is
clear from the diagrams that a rate of return for schooling which is calculated
from the comparison of two cross sections will tend to underestimate the true
differential in lifetime earnings.
Given the rather strong implications of the assumption that vintage
effects exist in on—the—job investment, it is important to test the robustness
of our estimate of the years of highest degree—experience interaction. As I
have already indicated, in a short period of observation such as 10 years, it is
difficult to separate the effects which are due to differences in experience
from the effects which are due to the chronological year at which the highest
degree was obtained. For that reason a restriction was used which amounted to
stating that given the age of the scientist, changes in the age of highest
degree as such (or in break) have no effect on the expected slope of his earnings
profile. If there is an associated change in the year of highest degree, all
the effect on the slope is ascribed to it. It is, of course, possible that this
is a faulty specification, and it would be useful to examine at least one
alternative specification, especially since this alternative is frequently used
by other researchers.
I have therefore estimated equation (25) also in its unrestricted form.













indicate the main findings. In all subsamples there are strong effects
which are reflected in significant negative interactions for age at highest
degree and "break" with experience. (Recall that the square of postdegree
experience is also included.) With respect to the identification of the
vintage effects we encounter a considerable degree of multicollinearity. In
most fields the result is an insignificant effect for either postdegree
experience2 or the interaction ofyear of highest degree with experience. This
interaction tends to be somewhat smaller than that of the restricted equation in
those fields (chemistry and physics) in which the effects can be separated.
Associated with these changes is a slight increase in the coefficients of
the sample year. The unrestricted model thus predicts that the effects of
growth are more uniformly distributed across levels of experience, indicating
smaller vintage effects. The direction of the interaction between year of
highest degree and experience tends to remain positive. In terms of Figure 5
the unrestricted version produces identical cross section predictions, but the
cohort predictions tend to be flatter than in the restricted case.
A somewhat different test of robustness arises from the question whether
the apparent positive interaction between experience and year of highest degree
reflects conditions which are specific to the decade 1960—1970. In particular,
one may think that in a period of reduction in demand such as occurred in
physics, scientists of different experience levels are affected differently.
Probably the hardest hit will be new entrants and we shall thus find an increase
in the experience earnings differentials which we misinterpret as a change in
the slope of individual profiles. A rudimentary test of this possibility can
be performed by estimating the earnings function separately for the periods
1960—1966 and 1966—1970, since the two periods had rather different demand
conditions. Performing this test I found that the interaction of year of
highest degree with experience is positive also within each subperiod; in fact,
it tends to be stronger in the period 1960—1966.48
It seems clear that further study is required in order to identify the
size and the sign of the experience—year of highest degree interaction. Our
attempts for such an identification are inescapably restricted by the short
length of the period. Hopefully we shall be able to obtain sharper estimates
with the use of longitudinal data."
We shall conclude with a brief discussion of the effects of sex and
quality of school on the slope of the earnings profile. Despite the relatively
small number of women in the sample we are able to identify a significant
reduction in the slope of the earnings profile for females. Similar results
were reported by Johnson and Stafford [1974]. It is interesting to note,
however, that the reduction persists even when one controls for breaks in the
accumulation of experience.
Surprising is the fact that being ranked among the top ten schools
appears to have little effect on the earnings profiles. The only fields in
which we find the expected positive interaction between quality and experience
to be significant are physics and mathematics. This is a troubling finding
since if quality effects are weak, why should we expect vintage effect to be
important?
A possible explanation is that there is a learning and selection process
whereby employers are initially paying more to the holders of Ph.D.s from
prestigious universities, since without any additional information they are
presumed to be more productive. However, as experience accumulates employers
learn to separate the wheat from the chaff in both groups and the wage differ-
ences among those actually employed in the two groups are reduced. For that
reason one may overestimate the expected slope of the scientists from low quality
schools and underestimate that of scientists from top ranked schools. A similar
argument, by the way, may lead us to underestimate the vintage effects.49
Conclusions
An attempt was made in this study to explain earnings differentials
among Merican scientists within the confines of a rather narrowly specified
model. We thus related differences in the level and the rate of growth in
earnings to differences in occupation, type of employer, age, experience, and
schooling level. Our basic presumption was that such observed relations can
be interpreted to some extent as reflecting individual differences in investment
behavior.
The basic principle that individuals can at some cost increase their
future earnings and that consequently observed earnings differentials and changes
in them contain a voluntary and potentially predictable element is probably
widely accepted. There may be a considerable difference of opinion, however,
as to the specification of the degree of competitiveness of the labor market,
the importance of borrowing constraints, the quality of information which is
available to employer and employees, and the relative importance of nonmonetary
considerations. As the reader probably observed, we assumed that decisions are
made under conditions which, though convenient to the researcher, are not
necessarily the best first approximation to "reality." We thus assumed that
the individual earning capacity, though not directly observable to the researcher,
is known to employer and employee, that markets are sufficiently competitive
to make general training a feasible alternative, that individuals can borrow
freely on account of their future earnings, and that the effects of uncertainty
and nonmonetary differentials are negligible. The problem, of course, is how
to incorporate such elements in a sufficiently precise fashion so as to
generate testable hypotheses.
It should be recognized that in the present context the choice of
specification is extremely difficult since we do not observe the investment50
process directly. We only observe its outcomes in the form of earnings. The
promotion of unobservables such as human capital, permanent income, or ability
to a central theoretical role put a heavy burden on the empirical researcher.
A partial solution is to use data on the same individuals observed over a
period of time to estimate the model in a differential form (e.g. equation 15).
I am currently working on such an estimation, using the earnings of the same




The purpose of this appendix is to derive equations 8 tO 11, 15 and 18
in the text. We shall reverse the order of the exposition and start with
the more general case in which age and time effects are included.
The problem can be written as:
(Al) max =D(U+T)R(1+T)Krg(x)+ p(a(T) x —) ]
where,
a (T)
(A2) g(x) =[ 1
— x
j
for0 ￿ x x0





x for x0 x 1
The assumption that the functionsa (T) and (r) are proportional to
each other guarantees that g(x) is independent of T.
We denote by D(jJ+T) the market discount factor for future earnings so
that + Similarly we denote =
Thenecessary conditions for optimums are:
(A3) g'(x) + a(T)1 0 if x0 x1
g' (x) + a(r)4i0 if x =0
g'(x) + a(T)* =0if 0 < x <52
.
and
(A4) i —[r + 6— g ]i—a(T)x—g(x), T) =0.
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In the case of an interior solution we can take the derivative of the
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a where y =—— isthe rate of decay in learning ability. The rate of in—
t a
crease in observed earning is given by
__ __ .
(A6) = ++g' (x)= +a(T) x —6+g' (x)
g (x) Kg(x)
and substituting for c we obtain
—Y (A7) = + a(T)x —6+
g(x) g"(x) L+t +t t]
—g'(x) g' Cx) r—g(x)+ xg' (x) 1
g(x) g"(x) L g' (x) ] a(T)
Under the special functional form(A2):
(A8) [g' (x)fi=
0. —g(x) + xg' (x)_____+x(0.—l) ________— and
g(x)g"(x) 0.—i g'(x) cta(r) 0.
.53
hence
(A9) = — +.i{ r1
+ 6 — — +
Equation 10 is a special case with=y=0andand r are constant.
Equation 15 is a special case with =0and y and r are constant. Equa-
tion l8is a special case in which y =0andis independent of age.
Let us now turn to the static case assuming no age effects and deter-
mine the length of each of the phases in the individual investment program.
During the last phase of zero investment we have:
AlO=(r+6)*-1 and (T) = 1-e6TT)]
the age of the peak in earnings is determined by the condition:
All p(t1) =—g'(O)= (1—
or
A12. T—T1 = ln(1—
(r+cS))
To determine the length of the investment on the job phase, we have to solve
equation 11 and use the boundary conditions in equation 12.
Define q =y=1—x,thenequation11 in the text can be rewritten54
as:
-
(A13)q =Aq+ Bq2 where A = and B =
withthesolution:





usingthe boundary conditions we obtain:
(Ai5) T1 —to = [in(A+B) + in (—).
Theschooling (or specialization period) is then found as a residual
using the identity:
(A16) T0T —(T—t1)—(T1—T0)
Equation Ai4 can be aiso used to derive an explicit solution for the invest-






1. It is possible that there exist an automatic process of learning
from experience which is to some extent independent of individual decisions
(that is, g(x) approaches 1 at a positive +6). In such a context the
theory only explains differences in the slope of the earnings profiles in
terms of differential investment. It is clearly not necessary to assume
positive investment for the purpose of explaining a positive slope of the
earnings profile.
2. Using equation (7) in the text we obtain
— i—a 1 — 1 —1a r+6
o 3a
—
—r—6(a—i—6)(a—)' ——r—(a—r—6) (a—8)1' >









, B= , q0
= ( — 1).
Note that A + Bq0 =ar6
is independent of .Wethus have:





After some manipulations we arrive at:
_______ A+Bq0 A =
A2(l—a)
[in((A+B)q) —jj (l—q0)].






aT0 1 A(l—q0) A
A2(l—ct) (A+B)q0
—j—(l—q)] <0.
4. The relation between the form of g(x) and the concavity of the log
earning profile during the investment period is given by:
.2 z =[x]F(x)




When g(x) =(1—- x),then F(x) =0for all x.
For any function g(x) such that g >0,g' <0,g" <0,a sufficient
condition for F(x) <0and thus <0is that g" 0.
For a detailed discussion of the case in which g" =0,see Rosen [1975].
Needless to say, under our specification g" <0.
5. An implicit assumption in this formulation is that individuals with
different levels of skills are perfect substitutes in production. There is
thus a single rental rate.
6. If the state of knowledge is a function of past investment of all
generations, then this process implies a discrepancy between the private and
social returns for investment in human capital (see Arrow [1962] and Levhari
[19661). Thus even If one may express doubts as to the importance of educa-
tional externalities within a generation, they are probably important within
an intergenerational context.
7. For the sake of simplicity we ignored in the analysis the direct
costs of the training process. If all costs are the opportunity costs of
the individual (e.g. a new worker in the firm observes the others work
without affecting their productivity), then changes in the rental rate of57
human capital will not affect investment decisions. In the more realistic
with direct costs the reduction in the rental rate will also put a check on
the tendency for increased investment. The probable increases in the marginal
cost of teaching will provide a further check.
8. The simple correlation between experience and being in private
industry is .032 for Ph.D.s in all fields. The correlation between government
employment and experience is .007.
9. Strictly speaking we can determine the effects of such breaks in
career only if their timing is known. Consequently, equation (25) and the
associated unrestricted form should only be viewed as an approximation.
More specifically, let there be a break at time then equation (17')
should have the form
(17') lu Y(T) in Y(T0) + -j---— [ —ct(r+ -— y)](r"r0c)
T0 +-i--—— [2-c —(T—T0—c)](T—T0—c) + i— 2c(-r0—r1).
The last term is not included in our specification. The error is likely to
be larger (in absolute value) the later is the break.
10. Strictly speaking, we estimate a simplified version of equation
(25), in which all higher than second order interactions are omitted. For
instance, we omit the age by year of highest degree by experience interaction.
11. The indicator is missing for 1960, and we imputed for it the
appropriate means from the 1966 and 1970 data.
12. Predegree experience is defined to be experience minus years since
degree if the difference is positive. It is defined to be zero otherwise.
It should be pointed out that in the cases in which the difference is positive
but there is a break in career after the acquisition of the degree, then we
in fact obtain true predegree experience minus break rather than predegree58
experience alone. We cannot discover the existence of such breaks from the
data. The only case in which a break is revealed is when reported experience
is less than years since degree.
13. This is a phenomenon which requires explanation. There are clearly
demand considerations which require that a teacher in academic institutions
be at least as trained (or as selected) as the students which he produces.
There are, however, some supply considerations as well. The more educated
are more willing to forego the monetary advantage of private industry for
the non—monetary advantage of educational institutions (see Weiss [1974]).
14. Partially this is a reflection of errors in reporting experience.
My initial processing of the longitudinal data reveals conflicting reports
of experience at different years by the same individual.
15. It would be interesting to interact this effect with time. But
given the small number of women in the sample our treatment of the male—female
differential is somewhat casual. For a detailed analysis, see Johnson and
Stafford [l974b].
16. With respect to the remaining controls we assume that preexperience
is zero, sex is male, and degree is from a school not ranked in the top ten.
17. We use as an estimate the coefficient for the 1970 sample divided
by 10. A more efficient estimate, one which would incorporate the information
on the rate of change between 60 and 66, would be to impose a restriction
that the rate of growth is constant and reestimate equation (26). The
marginal effect of such a procedure turned out to be negligible.
18. In agriculture and biology the estimate for the coefficient of break
is suspiciously high. It indicates a very slight or negative advantage to a
continuous accumulation of experience in these fields.
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19. The proportions of scientists with less than 10 years of experience,








20. In physics we have initial estimates which are derived from pooling
six cross sections in which each of the physicists is observed six times.
The results for the restricted form are extremely close to the results reported
here. For the unrestricted form we obtain a considerably higher estimate
for the year of highest degree—experience interaction. The lower stability
of the unrestricted form reflects the multicollinearity problem.60
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